1. Usar 190 1
2. Usarc Pam 190 1 Physical Security Program 190 13 1
3. Usarak Reg 190 1

1. USP&FO Supply & Property, Security & Storage Compliance. 1) Written Physical Security Plan IAW FM 190-30 2). Department of the Army Information Security Program.
2. Usar pam 190 1 physical security program,document about usar pam 190 1 physical security program,download an entire usar pam 190 1 physical security program document onto your computer.

( The Army Physical Security Program), AR 190-11,. AR 190- 13 cited in para 2a The Army. Filesize: 354 KB. Army's pamphlet 10-1 - United States Army. Enlistment Program 9D, U.S. Army Officer/Warrant Officer Enlistment Program 910, page 91. United States Army Reserve Enlistment Programs, page 92.

Army Regulation 190–51 Military Police Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 30 September 1993 UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY of CHANGE AR 190–51 Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) This revision– o Consolidates paragraphs 6 through 9, 11, 13, 15 through 17, and 19 of AR 190-18 into chapter 5 and AR 190-50 into chapter 4. o Consolidates all responsibilities, to include controlled substances and museums (chap 1). Adds requirements for conducting risk analyses during construction planning for assets of units or activities that will occupy new or renovated facilities or facility additions (para 2-2). o Adds some minimum security measures and terrorism counteraction measures asset categories. Security measures now consist of physical protective measures, security procedural measures, and terrorism counteraction measures (sections II and III, chap 3). Broadens asset categories and adds security measures for assets not previously in the regulation (for example, mission-critical and high-risk personnel (para 3-19), general civilian and or military personnel (para 3- 20), and industrial and utility equipment (para 3-21)). o Consolidates all storage structure requirements and allows for alternative construction based on delay time for the different construction being equal to or greater than the response time (app B).

We will write a custom essay sample onArmy Regulation 190–51

or any similar topic only for you

Order Now

o Adds intrusion detection system requirements in some situations to increase delay after detection (para B-1). Consolidates all marking requirements (app C). o Authorizes exact replication of any DA or DD forms prescribed in this regulation generated by the automated Military Police Information Management System in place of the official printed version of the form (app A, sec III). Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 30 September 1993 Military Police Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) *Army Regulation 190–51 Effective 30 October 1993 H i s t o r y . T h i s U P D A T E p r i n t i n g p u b l i s h e s a c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f t h r e e egulations pertaining to physical security; AR 190–18, AR 190–50, and AR 190–51. B e c a u s e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e r e v i s e d t e x t has been reorganized, no attempt has been m a d e t o h i g h l i g h t c h a n g e s f r o m e a r l i e r printings. S u m m a r y . T h i s r e g u l a t i o n i m p l e m e n t s DODD 5200. 8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources, and sets forth physic a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c i e s , p r o c e d u r e s , a n d s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e s a f e g u a r d i n g o f U . S . Army property. It provides guidance for rotection of both sensitive and nonsensit i v e s u p p l i e s a n d e q u i p m e n t , c o n t r o l l e d c r y p t o g r a p h i c i t e m s , c o n t r o l l e d m e d i c a l substances and sensitive items, and historically significant items in the care of the U. S. Army museum system. It gives commanders the flexibility to enhance physic a l s e c u r i t y b y a d a p t i n g i n v e s t e d resources to meet local needs based on risk analysis results. Actual physical security posture will be based on local conditions; however, it must not be less than he minimum standards for the categories of U. S. Army property specified in this regulation. Applicability. This regulation applies to elements of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, the U. S. Army Reserve, the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, and U. S. Army contractors which use or handle both sensitive and nonsensitive unclass i f i e d U . S . A r m y p r o p e r t y . T h i s publication applies during partial and full mobilization. Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Plans. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation that a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c o n t r o l l i n g l a w a n d regulation. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans may delegate this authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. The a p p r o v a l a u t h o r i t y w i l l c o o r d i n a t e a l l questions regarding the scope of authority t o a p p r o v e e x c e p t i o n s w i t h H Q D A D A J A – A L ) , W a s h i n g t o n , D C 20310–2200. Army management control process. This regulation is subject to the requirements of AR 11–2. It contains internal control provisions but does not contain checklists for conducting internal control reviews. These checklists are contained in D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y C i r c u l a r 11–89–2. S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited witho u t p r i o r a p p r o v a l f r o m H Q D A D A M O – O D L – S ) , 4 0 0 A r m y P e n t a g o n , Washington, DC 20310–0400. I n t e r i m c h a n g e s . I n t e r i m c h a n g e s t o this regulation are not official unless they a r e a u t h e n t i c a t e d b y t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. U s e r s w i l l d e s t r o y i n t e r i m c h a n g e s o n their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded. Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d C h a n g e s t o P u b l i c a t i o n s a n d

B l a n k F o r m s ) d i r e c t l y t o H Q D A ( D A M O – O D L – S ) , 4 0 0 A r m y P e n t a g o n , Washington, DC 20310–0400. Distribution. Distribution of this publication is made in accordance with the requirements on DA Form 12–09E, block 2568, intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, Army National Guard, and the U. S. Army Reserve. Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number) Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1 Purpose • 1–1, page 1 References • 1–2, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms • 1–3, page 1 Responsibilities • 1–4, page 1 This regulation supersedes paragraphs 6 through 9, 11, 13, 15 through 17, and 19 of AR 190–18, 1 April 1984; AR 190–50, 31 March 1986; and AR 190–51, 31 March 1986. AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 i UNCLASSIFIED Contents—Continued Security measures and standards • 1–5, page 2 Waivers and exceptions • 1–6, page 2 Chapter 2 Risk Analysis, page 2 General • 2–1, page 2 Use of risk analysis • 2–2, page 3 Implementation of risk analysis • 2–3, page 3 Chapter 3 Physical Security Standards by Category of Army Property, page 3 Section I Security overview, page 3 General • 3–1, page 3 Categories of Army property • 3–2, page 4 Section II

Minimum Security Standards for Categories of Army Property Using Risk Analysis, page 4 Aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities • 3–3, page 4 Aircraft and components not at Army aviation facilities • 3–4, page 6 Vehicles and carriage–mounted/towed weapons systems and components • 3–5, page 6 Communications and electronics equipment and night vision devices • 3–6, page 8 Organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) stored at central issue facilities • 3–7, page 9 OCIE not stored at central issue facilities • 3–8, page 9 Subsistence items stored at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence activities (TISAs) • 3–9, page 10 Subsistence items not at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence activities • 3–10, page 11

Repair parts at installation level supply support activities and direct support units with an authorized stockage list (ASL) • 3–11, page 11 Repair parts not at installation level support activities and direct support units • 3–12, page 11 Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) at bulk storage facilities • 3–13, page 11 POL not at bulk storage facilities • 3–14, page 12 Facility engineering supply and construction material storage areas • 3–15, page 13 Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices at training and audiovisual support centers (TASCs) • 3–16, page 14 Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices at units or activities that are not training and audiovisual support centers • 3–17, page 14

Aircraft and vehicles with classified onboard equipment or components • 3–18, page 14 Mission–critical and high–risk personnel • 3–19, page 15 General civilian and or military personnel • 3–20, page 15 Industrial and utility equipment • 3–21, page 16 Section III Minimum Security Standards for Other Categories of Army Property, page 16 Hand tools, tool sets and kits, and shop equipment • 3–22, page 16 Administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment • 3–23, page 17 Controlled cryptographic items (CCI) • 3–24, page 17 Unit supply rooms • 3–25, page 18 Postal unique items • 3–26, page 18 Chapter 4 Security of Medical Supplies and Equipment, page 18 ii AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 Contents—Continued Section I Policy and Personnel Selection, page 18 General • 4–1, page 18 Security policy • 4–2, page 18 Personnel selection • 4–3, page 19

In–transit security of controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items • 4–4, page 19 Disposal of controlled medical substances and items • 4–5, page 19 Section II Structural Standards for Bulk Storage Facilities, page 19 Storage of Notes R, Q, and C items • 4–6, page 19 Note R items • 4–7, page 19 Note Q items • 4–8, page 20 Note C items • 4–9, page 20 Controlled medical substances or sensitive medical items • 4–10, page 20 Section III Physical Security Measures and Control Procedures, page 20 Safeguards during nonduty hours • 4–11, page 20 Security checks • 4–12, page 20 Intrusion detection system and security lighting • 4–13, page 20 Lock and key control • 4–14, page 21 Section IV Physical Security Standards for Pharmacy Storage, page 21 Pharmacy storage structural standards • 4–15, page 21

Physical security measures and control procedures • 4–16, page 21 Section V Medical Treatment Facilities and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Laboratory Facilities, page 21 Medical treatment facilities and RDT&E laboratory structural standards • 4–17, page 21 Physical security measures and control procedures • 4–18, page 22 Crash carts, emergency trays, and ambulances • 4–19, page 22 Medically sensitive items • 4–20, page 22 Chapter 5 Physical Security of U. S. Army Museums, page 22 Section I Inspections and Personnel Selection, page 22 General • 5–1, page 22 Inspections • 5–2, page 22 Museum personnel selection • 5–3, page 23 Section II

Museum Structures and Indoor and Outdoor Displays, page 23 Structural requirements • 5–4, page 23 Locks and keys • 5–5, page 23 Security lighting • 5–6, page 23 Intrusion detection systems • 5–7, page 24 Exhibit or display cases • 5–8, page 24 Museum workshops • 5–9, page 24 Security forces • 5–10, page 24 Museum parks • 5–11, page 24 Museums in civilian communities • 5–12, page 24 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 iii Contents—Continued Reporting loss of property • 5–13, page 24 Accountability of equipment • 5–14, page 24 Museum weapons and ammunition • 5–15, page 24 Appendixes A. References, page 25 B. Storage Structure Security, page 29 C. Marking of Army Property, page 33 D.

Keys, Locks, Locking Devices (including Hasps and Chains), and Protective Seals, page 33 Glossary Index iv AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 Chapter 1 Introduction 1–1. Purpose This regulation prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for safeguarding unclassified U. S. Army property, both sensitive and nonsensitive. Its policy objectives are to— a. Establish standardized, minimum acceptable security requirements for specified categories of U. S. Army property. b. Provide a risk analysis method that allows commanders the flexibility to tailor physical security posture and resources to meet local needs. c. Reduce loss, theft, misuse, and damage of Army assets cost effectively. 1–2. References

Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A. 1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary. 1–4. Responsibilities a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) will— (1) Provide overall staff responsibility for the security of unclassified Army property (sensitive and nonsensitive). (2) Coordinate with the Army Staff (ARSTAF) and major Army commands (MACOMs) to establish policy, procedures, and standards pertaining to security of Army property. b. The Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers will resolve any conflicts in U. S.

Army policy concerning the control of controlled cryptographic items (CCI). c. Installation commanders, major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), and state adjutants general (AG) will— (1) Ensure a risk analysis is conducted for the assets of all assigned and tenant units and activities maintaining specified facilities for particular categories of Army property under this regulation and for any other assets which have been designated mission essential or vulnerable as indicated in Army Regulation (AR) 190–13. (2) Ensure a risk analysis is conducted for the assets of units and activities which are to occupy new or renovated facilities or facility additions.

Risk analyses for assets to be located in such facilities will be performed during the planning stages of the facility construction or renovation so that security measures can be incorporated at the project’s inception. (3) Determine security requirements for museum activities in their commands and comply with this and other related regulations and directives. d. The numbered armies in the continental United States (CONUSA), installation, division, MUSARC, separate brigade commanders, and state AGs, upon declaration of war or when operating in a designated hostile area, may prescribe procedures suspending specific provisions of this regulation to account for local conditions while ensuring maximum practical security for Government personnel and property. This authority may be delegated to commanders in the grade of lieutenant colonel. e.

Unit commanders or activity chiefs will control and safeguard all supply and equipment areas within their command or activity. They will— (1) Promptly report to the provost marshal or equivalent organization, investigate, and resolve incidents involving loss, theft, misuse, or damage of Army resources. (2) Establish end–of–day security checks using Standard Form (SF) 701 (Activity Security Checklist). (3) Implement security measures associated with the conduct of risk analysis using this regulation and Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 190–51. (4) Ensure physical security officers are appointed, in writing, to perform, as a minimum, the duties outlined in AR 190–13. 5) Ensure security plans outlining responsibilities and procedures for the proper control and accountability of assets are written and appropriately disseminated. (6) Ensure assets are secured by approved locking devices (locks, chains, seals, etc. ) as outlined in appendix D. f. Units, activities, and installations involved in supply operations will protect their own supplies and equipment as indicated in this regulation. g. Facility commanders will ensure physical security inspections are conducted per AR 190–13. In addition, commanders may request the U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) to conduct crime prevention surveys for the purpose of detecting crime, evaluating the possibilities of easy criminal activity, and identifying procedures conducive to criminal activity. h.

Commanders and individuals who are assigned custody of controlled medical substances cited in this regulation AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 1 are responsible for implementing the measures to safeguard them required by this regulation. These responsibilities include: (1) Ensuring physical security responsibilities are fixed in the receipt, storage, issue, transportation, use, disposal, turn–in, and accounting for all controlled medical substances and sensitive items. (2) Providing specific security instructions to individuals who are in the possession and control of, or who are responsible for, controlled medical substances and sensitive items. 3) Ensuring the careful selection of personnel, including volunteer workers, who are assigned duties that require access to controlled medical substances and sensitive items storage areas or who have custodianship or possession of keys and combinations to locks securing these areas. (4) Taking action to deny access to controlled substances by individuals undergoing investigation, treatment, rehabilitation, judicial or nonjudicial processes, or administrative action as a result of actual or suspected drug abuse or as a result of suspected illegal activity involving controlled drugs (for example, theft, wrongfully prescribing, inventory manipulation, etc. ). (5) Establishing appropriate escort procedures and designating escort personnel, by name or duty position, to escort unauthorized people into storage areas. 6) Ensuring a physical security officer is appointed, in writing, by the medical facility commander to assure that appropriate protection is provided for all controlled medical substances and sensitive items. i. The museum curator is the authority who decides if a weapon is antique or unique and if it should be made inoperable for display purposes. 1–5. Security measures and standards a. Physical security measures or standards more stringent than those contained in this regulation, as appropriate, will be developed jointly by the tenant activity commander, the installation physical security officer, and host installation commander. Such measures will be based on a threat analysis developed from the risk analysis in DA Pam 190–51 using Technical Manual (TM) 5–853–1.

These measures will be incorporated into the installation physical security plan as an annex. b. Provisions for security and necessary funding will be included in normal budget documents. Tenant activities must identify their security requirements to the host installation. c. Installation of intrusion detection systems (IDS) will be according to the applicable Office of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers guide specifications and with applicable Army regulations (to include AR 190–13). d. Provision of security measures beyond those required by this regulation will be per TM 5–853–1. 1–6. Waivers and exceptions a. Waivers and exceptions for all unclassified Army property discussed in this regulation will be considered individually. 1) Requests for waivers and exceptions will be submitted, in writing, with complete justification and a statement of compensatory measures in effect through command channels and through the MACOM commander or appropriate staff element having staff cognizance to HQDA (DAMO–ODL–S), 400 ARMY PENTAGON, WASH, DC 20310–0400. Waivers will not be granted for periods exceeding 12 months. Exceptions will be regarded as permanent; however, they will be reviewed and revalidated every 2 years by HQDA (DAMO–OL–S), which retains the authority to revoke exceptions. (2) Requests for waivers or exceptions will be coordinated with the law enforcement activity, provost marshal, or security officer.

When structural deficiencies exist, requests also will be coordinated with the supporting Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH) or equivalent organization. (3) Active and reserve component provost marshals will submit through command channels and their MACOM to HQDA (DAMO–ODL–S) a list of exceptions to physical security requirements and indicate whether the exceptions are to be continued or canceled. b. Waivers and exceptions to the requirements of this regulation will be kept to a minimum. (1) Authority to grant waivers and exceptions is delegated to HQDA (DAMO–ODL–S). (2) Requests for waivers and exceptions will include an adequate description of circumstances requiring the action and a description of compensatory measures.

Requests will be submitted, in writing, through command channels to HQDA (DAMO–ODL–S) for individual evaluation. Blanket waivers or exceptions are not authorized. (3) Waivers normally will be valid up to but not to exceed 1 year. A permanent exception from the specific requirements of this regulation will be permitted only under the conditions described below. (a) Unique circumstances at a given unit, facility, or installation are such that conformance to the established standards is impossible, highly impracticable, or unnecessary. (b) Security afforded is equal to or greater than that provided by the standard criteria. 2 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 Chapter 2 Risk Analysis 2–1. General a.

To provide the most practical protection for Army assets, commanders must identify the assets to be protected and analyze the risks to those assets from espionage, sabotage, terrorism, damage, misuse, and theft. Analysis of these risks will assist in determining the type and minimum level of protection needed to safeguard the identified resources adequately and economically. b. The objectives of risk analyses are to— (1) Provide commanders a tool with which to design a physical security system based on local needs. (2) Allow commanders the flexibility to adapt the use of physical security resources to local risk conditions. (3) Obtain the maximum security return from invested fiscal and manpower resources. 4) Serve as a basis for an asset–specific threat analysis. 2–2. Use of risk analysis a. The background and explanation of step–by–step procedures for determining security requirements and conducting a risk analysis for categories of Army property are in DA Pam 190–51. b. A risk analysis will be conducted for those installations or facilities that the installation or MUSARC commanders or the State AGs determine mission essential or vulnerable as indicated in AR 190–13 and which include one or more of the categories of U. S. Army property addressed in this regulation. A risk analysis will be conducted on all mission essential and vulnerable areas (MEVAs)— (1) When a unit or activity is activated. 2) When a unit permanently relocates to a new site or facility. (3) When no formal record exists of a prior risk analysis. (4) At least every 3 years or more frequently at the discretion of the unit or activity commander. (5) During the planning stages of new facilities, additions to facilities, and facility renovations. (6) When an incident occurs in which an asset is compromised. c. The risk analysis will be conducted jointly by designated representatives of the installation commander, the using unit or activity, and the supporting installation provost marshal or equivalent security officer representative. 2–3. Implementation of risk analysis a.

Based on the risk analysis results, the unit commander or activity chief will implement the physical protective measures and security procedures described in chapters 3, 4, or 5 of this regulation, as appropriate. b. Results of the risk analysis and physical protective measures, security procedural measures, and terrorism counteraction measures to be implemented will be recorded on DA Form 7278–R (Risk Level Worksheet), with all attachments as necessary. Instructions for the use of DA Form 7278–R are in DA Pamphlet 190–51. Copies of these records will be kept by the supporting provost marshal or equivalent security officer at the unit or activity concerned and at the reserve component provost marshal’s office where applicable. The results will be used in planning and assessing physical security programs under AR 190–13. c.

The risk analysis may be reviewed and portions of the results changed at the discretion of the installation CONUSA or MUSARC commander or State AG. This could be based on a significant change in risk factors to a specific category of Army property, to a particular unit or activity, or to the overall installation. Any discretionary changes made by the installation commander will be coordinated with the installation provost marshal or equivalent security officer. Chapter 3 Physical Security Standards by Category of Army Property Section I Security overview 3–1. General a. In this chapter, common types of U. S. Army property are classified in readily understandable categories for quick reference.

Guidance for each category of property listed includes references to the primary directives for management and accountability of that category of property and minimum security standards to be implemented. b. Section II of this chapter outlines physical protective, security procedural, and terrorism counteraction measures for particular categories of property maintained at U. S. Army installations or facilities. The measures are categorized according to their risk levels established using the risk analysis procedure in DA Pam 190–51. Risk Level I physical AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 3 protective and security procedural measures will be treated as minimums.

Physical protective and security procedural measures primarily address threats related to theft of the asset. Additional terrorism counteraction measures address terrorist threats related to the killing of people or the destruction of assets. Such measures are only included for asset categories for which they apply. c. Section III of this chapter outlines minimum required security measures to be implemented for other specified categories of property. Although these categories of Army property do not require the conduct of risk analysis using DA Pam 190–51, the principles of risk analysis should be applied and risk factors considered. d. For those categories of U. S.

Army property where perimeter fencing is required as a protective measure, the type and quantity of fencing, including the height (6 or 7 feet) and whether a top guard or other features are required, will be based on the judgment of the installation commander and the guidance found in Field Manual (FM) 19–30. Unless otherwise specified, perimeter fence will meet the requirements of U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Drawing No. 40–16–08, Type FE–5. Copies of this drawing normally may be obtained from the installation engineer. If the drawing is not available locally, requests may be forwarded to the Commander, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville, Division, ATTN: CEHND–ED–ES–1, P. O. Box 1600, Huntsville, Alabama 35807–4301. The minimum height will be 6 feet.

Use of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard design fencing is also authorized. Modifications to existing perimeter fences should not be made solely to conform to the requirements of this regulation if the existing fencing provides a similar deterrent to penetration. e. In those instances where security lighting is required, FM 19–30 will be used as a guide in deciding lighting patterns and minimum protective lighting intensities and requirements. f. Conflicts between security and safety requirements must be identified in writing. Waiver or exception requests must list compensatory measures and be forwarded through the local provost marshal and MACOM to HQDA (DAMO–ODL–S) for approval. 3–2. Categories of Army property

Items of property will not always correspond exactly to the categories listed in sections II or III. Some items may fall into two categories. When this situation occurs, the unit commander directly responsible for the asset is responsible for determining the most appropriate category for the item in question. If none is appropriate, the commander will develop and carry out those security procedures and physical protective measures necessary to safeguard the property. Section II Minimum Security Standards for Categories of Army Property Using Risk Analysis 3–3. Aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities a. Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 95–1. (2) AR 190–16. 3) AR 710–2. (4) AR 735–5. (5) DA Pam 710–2–1. b. Aircraft with arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) aboard. Army aircraft with AA&E aboard will be secured as indicated in AR 190–11 and this regulation. Army National Guard aircraft with AA&E aboard will be secured as indicated in NGR 190–11 and this regulation. (1) When not in use, aircraft containing weapons will be parked inside an aircraft parking area. The parking area will be lighted and will have either continuous surveillance or IDS. (2) When operational readiness permits, weapons mounted on aircraft that are accessible and easily removable will be removed and stored in a secure location.

Weapons that remain installed on the aircraft will be made inoperable by removing barrels or firing mechanisms when practicable. Removed components will be stored in a secured location. A secured location is an arms room, an ammunition supply point, an area under continuous armed surveillance, or any structure meeting the requirements for storage of category I or II AA&E in AR 190–11 or NGR 190–11. c. Accessible and easily removable components. Additional security for accessible and easily removable components will be by storage in a secure structure (app B). d. Aircraft with classified equipment. U. S. Army aircraft with classified equipment aboard will be secured as indicated in AR 380–5, Technical Bulletin (TB) 380–41, and paragraph 3–18 of this regulation.

Classified components which can be readily removed without damage to them should be placed in secure storage as indicated in AR 380–5. e. Physical protective measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Army aircraft at Army aviation facilities will be secured with manufacturer–installed or approved modification work order ignition and door–locking security devices when not in use. Aircraft undergoing maintenance with duty personnel present and aircraft employed in tactical exercises are exempt. (b) Keys to locking devices and ignitions will be controlled. Key control and accountability must be established per 4 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 appendix D. Aircraft keys will not be issued for personal retention. Duplicate keys will not serve as operational keys at maintenance facilities. c) When not in use, aircraft and aircraft components, to include crew member equipment at Army aviation facilities, will be placed in the most secure hangars or structures available. If adequate hangar space is not available, this equipment may be stored on the ramp nearest the facility. (d) When aircraft are not stored in storage structures and when operational requirements permit, keep them in proximity to each other for ease of monitoring and away from the perimeter of the parking area. (2) Risk Level II. (a) All measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Aviation facility aircraft parking areas will be protected by a perimeter fence. (3) Risk Level III. (a) All measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. b) Aviation facility aircraft parking areas will be lighted at night sufficiently to allow security personnel to detect intruders. Airfield lighting will be coordinated with the aviation facility commander for consideration of safety and training issues. (c) IDS should be added to hangars and, where practical, around aircraft parking areas. f. Security procedural measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Each Army aviation facility will have a written physical security plan. FM 19–30 will be used as a guide. Aviation facilities located on or close to an Army installation will include the physical security plan as an annex to the installation physical security plan.

Aviation facilities located on other than Army property will coordinate the physical security plan with the appropriate host authorities. A copy of the physical security plan will be maintained by the State AG or MUSARC provost marshal for reserve component aviation facilities. (b) Each Army aviation facility will have a physical security officer. Responsibilities of the physical security officer are defined in AR 190–13. (c) For aircraft parked at Active Army aviation facilities and for U. S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) activities where guards or roving patrols are available, aircraft will be checked at least every 4 hours by a roving guard. d) At USAR and ARNG activities where guards or roving patrols are not available, local law enforcement agencies will be requested, in writing, to include the aviation facilities in their patrol areas and to check aircraft parking areas at intervals not exceeding once every 4 hours during nonoperational hours. (e) Access to aviation facility aircraft and aircraft components will be controlled at all times. The airfield will be designated as a restricted area as specified in AR 190–13. Measures such as badges, passes, or similar identification credentials are encouraged. (f) Privately–owned vehicles will be prohibited from the flight line or other areas where aircraft are parked, except when authorized, in writing, by the aviation facility or airfield commander. g) Aviation facility auxiliary power units for starting aircraft, vehicle tugs, forklifts, aircraft boarding ladders, and other items that might be used to circumvent existing security measures will be secured during nonduty hours to prevent unauthorized use. (2) Risk Level II. (a) All measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Entry to and exit from all buildings associated with the aviation facility, aircraft parking areas, and support equipment storage areas will be controlled at all times. Entry and exit can be controlled through manpower and procedural means, mechanical means, or electronic means. (c) Aircraft parked at Active Army aviation facilities will be checked at least once every hour by a roving guard. (3) Risk Level III. (a) All measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. b) Guards will provide continuous surveillance of aircraft parked at Active Army aviation facilities. Aviation unit personnel working on or near aircraft may be considered to be equivalent to continuous surveillance. (c) IDS may be installed as an alternative to providing continuous surveillance. (d) At USAR and ARNG facilities where guards or roving patrols are available, aircraft will be checked at least every 2 hours. Where guards or roving patrols are not available, local law enforcement agencies will be requested, in writing, to include USAR and ARNG aviation facilities in their patrol areas, and to check the parking areas at least once every 2 hours during nonoperational hours. g. Terrorism counteraction measures.

Due to the likely form of a terrorist attack against these assets, the physical protective measures and security procedural measures established above will also be applicable for protection against terrorist threats. Aviation facilities will develop a terrorism counteraction contingency plan. AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 5 3–4. Aircraft and components not at Army aviation facilities The property accountability requirements outlined in the references in paragraph 3–3a will be followed and paragraphs 3–3b, c, andd will be implemented. Physical protective measures for Risk Level I in paragraph 3–3 will also be implemented. In addition, the security procedures indicated below will apply. a. Aircraft will be parked, whenever practical, at a Government airfield or civilian airport with an active security program.

If a location has no security program and a crew member cannot remain with the aircraft, the aircraft commander will advise aviation facility and local law enforcement authorities of the aircraft location, identification, length of stay, and ways to contact crew members. b. The aircraft will be checked at least once daily by a crew member for tampering, sabotage, and loss or damage. 3–5. Vehicles and carriage–mounted/towed weapons systems and components a. Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 58–1. (2) AR 710–2. (3) AR 735–5. (4) DA Pam 710–2–1. (5) DA Pam 738–750. b. Army vehicles with weapons or ammunition aboard. These vehicles will be secured per AR 190–11.

When operational readiness permits, weapons mounted on vehicles that are accessible and easily removable will be removed and stored in a secure location. Unless there is an operational necessity determined by battalion or higher level commanders, firing mechanisms on weapons that are not easily removable will be removed from combat vehicle weapon systems and stored in the unit arms room or be under continuous surveillance. c. Army vehicles with classified equipment. These vehicles will be secured per AR 380–5 and paragraph 3–18 of this regulation. Classified components that can be readily removed without damage should be placed in secure storage as indicated in AR 380–5. d. Army vehicles when not in use.

These vehicles will be parked in motor pools to the maximum extent practicable. The motor pool will be protected by a perimeter fence or dedicated guards. FM 19–30 will be used as a guide for determining fencing requirements. e. Physical protective measures. (1) Risk Level I. Army vehicles parked in noncombat areas will be secured with a locking mechanism. These vehicles will be locked as follows: (a) Commercial–design vehicles. Activate manufacturer installed door and ignition–locking device(s). (b) Tactical vehicles and M880 series vehicles. Immobilize steering wheel with a chain and a U. S. Government approved padlock as specified in TB 9–2300–422–20. Activate installed door and ignition–locking devices.

Hood, spare tires, and fuel tank should also be secured with approved locking devices if the local environment warrants this action. Brass padlocks supplied with vehicles may be used to secure vehicles, except those uploaded with AA&E or other sensitive items, and as long as other security measures required by applicable regulations and directives are followed. (c) Other Army vehicles. M1008, 1009, and 1010 series vehicles and commercial utility and cargo vehicles (CUCV) will be secured by activating installed door and ignition locks and immobilizing the steering wheel with chain and U. S. Government approved padlock as specified in TB 43–001–39–7.

Alternatively, such vehicles may be stored in a secure structure. (d) Material handling equipment. Material handling equipment (MHE) and other Army vehicles which cannot be secured as indicated in (a) through(c) above should have the steering mechanism immobilized or transmission lever locked in the neutral position. Alternatively, these vehicles may be stored in secure structures. (e) Signs. “Off Limits To Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at the activity entrances. (2) Exceptions. Exceptions to this policy are as follows: (a) Vehicles actively employed in tactical exercises and field operations, undergoing test and evaluation, or pending turn–in through property disposal channels. b) Dispatched emergency, military or security police, courtesy patrol, and interior guard vehicles for brief periods when response time is critical for the successful performance of the operator’s or crew’s duties. Ignition keys should be removed from unaccompanied vehicles. (c) Trailers, semitrailers, towed weapons systems, and other non–self–propelled vehicles. ( d ) I n o p e r a b l e , u n s e r v i c e a b l e v e h i c l e s . P r o c e d u r e s w i l l b e i m p l e m e n t e d t o p r o t e c t t h e s e v e h i c l e s f r o m cannibalization. (e) Vehicles, without installed locking mechanisms, under the continuous surveillance of a guard or located in a secure storage structure (app B). f) Vehicles of specific units outside the United States when so designated by the MACOM commander. Basis for a 6 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 unit exemption will be an impact on readiness. The commander will decide whether locking the unit’s vehicles would adversely affect readiness to the extent of jeopardizing the unit’s contingency mission. (g) Fuel tanker vehicles when, in the judgment of the installation commander, locking would create a potential unacceptable hazard to life or property. In this case, compensatory security measures as outlined in paragraph 3–14 will be taken. (h) Administrative use vehicles, as defined in AR 58–1, when dictated by safety requirements within an ammunition or explosives production or storage rea. (3) Accessible and easily removable components. These components, vulnerable to theft because of value or utility, will be removed and secured separately. Additional security for components will be provided by one of the following methods: (a) Storing in a secure storage structure (app B). (b) Storing in a locked, totally enclosed armored vehicle or truck van. (c) Storing in a locked equipment box or similar container secured to an open bed vehicle; for example, in a locked ammunition or tool box chained to the bed of a 21? 2-ton truck. (d) Securing the item directly to the vehicle by a locally fabricated method. (4) Master–keyed locksets.

Use of master–keyed locksets to secure Army vehicles or motor pools will be prohibited except under the following conditions: (a) When the lockset is used within one vehicle to secure the vehicle and its various storage compartments. Master–keyed locksets will not be used to secure more than one vehicle. (b) When the lockset is used to secure the manifold access doors and hatches of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) trucks (one set per truck) and, if they have hardened steel shackles, for the storage compartments of wreckers, heavy equipment, etc. (one set per vehicle). The same set will not be used on more than one vehicle. Master–keyed locks will not be used to secure vehicle steering wheels. (5) Keys and locks.

Keys and locks will be controlled according to appendix D. (6) Items used to defeat security measures. Items that can be used to defeat security measures, such as bolt cutters, hacksaws, oxyacetylene torches, axes, or steel rods or bars, will be secured in respective tool kits or other secure locations when not in use. (7) Risk Level II. (a) All measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Vehicle parking areas, except those for empty trailers, will be lighted during the hours of darkness. (c) Vehicles will be parked at least 20 feet from the perimeter of the parking area or as far from the perimeter as possible. (8) Risk Level III. a) All measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) Ground anchors will be constructed for trailers, semitrailers, and other towed equipment or a cable will be run through all items of such equipment and a lock will be affixed to one end. (c) Vehicles particularly vulnerable to theft, misappropriation, or damage will be placed in secured garages and motor sheds to the maximum extent practicable. f. Security procedural measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) For Active Army installations and for USAR and ARNG units and activities at locations where guards or roving patrols are available, motor pools will be checked for tampering, sabotage, loss, and damage not less than once every 4 hours. b) USAR and ARNG units and activities at locations where guards are not available will request, in writing, that the local law enforcement agency check the security of the motor pool at intervals not exceeding 4 hours during nonoperational hours. (c) Privately–owned vehicles will not be permitted in motor pools except that units engaged in deployment exercises may store privately–owned vehicles in the motor pool at the discretion of the installation or MUSARC commander, provided security measures are taken to safeguard Army vehicles and components remaining in the motor pool. (2) Risk Level II. (a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Entry to and exit from motor pools will be controlled.

Control of entry and exit may be by guards or locks on gates. Unit personnel working within the motor pool may be considered an alternative to guards. Consolidated motor pools will have memorandums of understanding to establish joint security procedures. (c) Types of vehicles particularly vulnerable to theft, misappropriation, or damage in the motor pool will be segregated. These vehicles will be placed where guards or unit personnel can see them during operating hours and where roving guards can see them during nonoperating hours. (d) On Active Army installations, guards will check the motor pool on an irregular basis, but perform security checks not less than once every 2 hours.

AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 7 (3) Risk Level III. (a) All measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) The motor pool will be designated a restricted area under AR 190–13. (c) Unit commanders, or their specifically designated representatives, will give written authorization before vehicles are dispatched. (d) Drivers will be checked for possession of a valid dispatch and operator’s permit by unit personnel or guards before they depart the motor pool. (e) Continuous surveillance will be made of the motor pool by guards on Active Army installations. (f) IDS may be installed as an alternative to providing continuous surveillance. g) At USAR and ARNG activities where guards or roving patrols are available, motor pools will be checked for tampering, sabotage, loss, or damage not less than once every 2 hours. Where guards or roving patrols are not available, local law enforcement agencies will be requested, in writing, to include USAR and ARNG motor pools in their patrol areas, and to check the parking areas at least once every 2 hours during nonoperational hours. g. Terrorism counteraction measures. Due to the likely nature of a terrorist attack against these assets, the physical protective measures and security procedural measures established above will also be applicable for protection against terrorist threats. 3–6.

Communications and electronics equipment and night vision devices Communications and electronics test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) and other high–value precision equipment, night vision devices that are not part of a weapons system, and tool kits are protected as follows: a. Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 710–2. (2) AR 735–5. (3) DA Pam 710–2–1. b. Physical protective measures (Risk Level I). (1) Portable items will be provided double barrier protection when not in use, to include training environments and while in transit. Examples of double barrier protection include— (a) A locked or guarded separate building or an enclosed van, trailer, or armored vehicle protected by a perimeter fence. (b) A locked steel cage located in a secure storage structure (app B). c) A locked, built–in container (bin, drawer, cabinet) or a free–standing locked container located in a secure storage structure (app B). (d) Securely affixing the item to an internal structure of a secure storage structure (apps B and D). (e) Securely affixing the item to a locked vehicle which is under continuous surveillance or in a motor pool (app D). (2) Nonportable items will be secured in a building with doors and windows locked during the hours the facility is nonoperational. Particularly bulky or heavy items stored outside will be protected by a perimeter barrier. (3) “Off Limits to Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at the activity entrances. 4) Equipment will be located in the interior of the facility as far from the exterior as possible. (5) Tactical communications equipment remaining on vehicles will be secured to the vehicle with a medium security padlock. Vehicles will be secured per paragraph 3–5 of this regulation. (6) Tool kits will be secured as specified in paragraph 3–22. c. Physical protective measures (Risk Level II). (1) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (2) Portable, pilferage–coded items will be separated from other equipment and stored in a separate, locked, secure room, area, or container with controlled access. Secure rooms will be constructed per secure structure guidance in appendix B of this regulation. d.

Physical protective measures (Risk Level III). (1) All measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (2) The activity will be lighted during the hours of darkness. (3) Landscaping features greater than 1 foot in height and other features which may obstruct views around the facility and provide concealment for aggressors will be eliminated within 20 feet of the facility. (4) IDS will be installed around or on the storage room, area, or container. e. Security procedural measures (Risk Level I). (1) Access to the equipment storage area will be controlled. (2) Access to keys, padlocks, and protective seals protecting assets will be controlled per appendix D. 3) Portable, pilferage–coded items temporarily assigned to a user will be issued on a hand receipt or a locally devised temporary receipt. f. Security procedural measures (Risk Level II). 8 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 (1) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (2) Privately–owned vehicles will not be permitted to park within 50 feet of the storage facility. (3) Periodic command–directed inventories will be made as indicated in AR 710–2. A copy of the inventory will be kept until the next inventory is conducted. g. Security procedural measures (Risk Level III). (1) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. 2) Stock accounting records for portable pilferage–coded items will be reviewed at least monthly by an officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO) (sergeant or above), or civilian employee of equivalent grade. A record of such review will be maintained until completion of the next monthly review. (3) The activity will be checked at least every 2 hours after normal duty hours by guards on Active Army installations. (4) Local law enforcement agencies will be requested, in writing, to include USAR and ARNG facilities storing communications and electronics equipment in their patrol areas and to check the facilities at least every 4 hours during nonoperational hours. 3–7. Organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) stored at central issue facilities a. Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 710–2. (2) AR 735–5. 3) DA Pam 710–2–1. b. Physical protective measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Stocks will be secured in a separate building or room meeting the security standards in appendix B. (b) “Off Limits To Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at facility entrances. (2) Risk Level II. (a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) High–value or small, easily pilferable items will be separated from other OCIE and stored in a secure, separate container, room, or building with controlled access. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) The facility exterior will be lighted during the hours of darkness. c) IDS will be installed in the facility. (d) Rooms or buildings will be constructed per secure storage structure guidance for at least Risk Level II in appendix B of this regulation. (e) Landscaping features greater than 1 foot in height and other features which may obstruct views around the facility and provide concealment for aggressors will be eliminated within 20 feet of the facility. c. Security procedural measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Access to the facility and to keys, padlocks, and protective seals protecting assets will be controlled per appendix D. (b) Periodic command–directed inventories will be conducted per AR 710–2. (2) Risk Level II. a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) The joint inventory check–out point will be placed next to the facility exit to preclude personnel from remaining in the facility once the OCIE has been inventoried. A copy of the inventory will be retained until the next inventory is conducted. (c) Privately–owned vehicles will not be parked within 50 feet of the storage facility. (d) Trash receptacles will not be located within 50 feet of the facility. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) The facility will be checked at least once every 2 hours by roving guards. 3–8. OCIE not stored at central issue facilities a.

Risk Level I physical protective measures and the security procedures in paragraph 3–7 will be implemented for OCIE stored centrally in units. b. Issued clothing will be marked as indicated in AR 700–84. c. Individual clothing and equipment of personnel living in troop billets and reserve component personnel will be secured by one of the following means to be determined by the commander: AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 9 (1) In a locked wall locker or footlocker. (2) In a locked duffel bag, further secured to the building structure, or a separate locked room. (3) Access to reserve component OCIE will be controlled by designated individuals. Locked duffel bags, wall lockers, or footlockers will be placed in a separate locked room or cage.

In lieu of a separate room, access to wall lockers may be controlled by modifying the lockers to accept a locking bar or by adding a second hasp and securing the locker with a second lock. Keys to access reserve component OCIE will be placed in the unit key depository and access will be controlled by the unit key custodian. d. Consideration should be given to marking items as indicated in appendix C. 3–9. Subsistence items stored at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence activities (TISAs) a. Property management accountability directives. (1) AR 30–1. (2) AR 30–18. (3) AR 30–19. (4) AR 735–5. b. Physical protective measures. (1) Risk Level I. a) Commissaries, commissary and subsistence warehouses, and TISAs will meet the construction requirements for secure storage structures in appendix B. (b) “Off Limits to Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at entrances to subsistence storage facilities (see AR 420–70). (c) Refrigeration units will be secured with approved locking devices or kept in a room or building meeting the standards for secure storage structures in appendix B. (d) Subsistence items temporarily stored outside the facility, such as in secured vans and reefer trucks, will have protective lighting. Use FM 19–30 as a guide to determine the type of protective lighting. e) Break areas will be located away from the storage areas. (f) Personal lockers will be in a designated area away from loose or broken containers of subsistence items. (2) Risk Level II. (a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Highly pilferable items such as cigarettes, coffee, and health and beauty aids will be placed in a separate locked room, cage, or container under the control of a designated property custodian. (c) Protective seals will be placed on doors and other operable openings into secured vans and reefer trucks in which subsistence items are stored outside the facility. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. b) The facility will be lighted during the hours of darkness. (c) IDS will be installed in the facility. (d) Landscaping features greater than 1 foot in height and other features which may obstruct views around the facility and provide concealment for aggressors will be eliminated within 20 feet of the facility. c. Security procedural measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Access to the facility and to keys and padlocks and protective seals protecting assets will be controlled according to appendix D. (b) Subsistence storage facilities will always be secured when entrances or exits are not under the surveillance of personnel assigned to the facility. c) Personal packages will be prohibited in ration breakdown and subsistence storage areas. (d) Shipping containers and cases will be inspected to ensure that they are empty prior to being disposed of and cardboard boxes will be flattened before disposal. (2) Risk Level II. (a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Personnel entering the storage facility who are not assigned to the activity will be logged in and out or, when practical, escorted. When using the log system, designate the destination of the unassigned person. (c) Accuracy of scales will be tested monthly with known weights or by using a second set of calibrated scales.

A written record of the monthly tests will be maintained for a period of 3 months. (d) Highly pilferable items will be spot–checked daily by supervisors to ensure that all items are accounted for. These items will also be inventoried each quarter and a copy of the inventory kept until the next inventory. (e) Trash receptacles will not be located within 50 feet of the facility. 10 AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 (f) Privately–owned vehicles will not be parked within 50 feet of the storage facility. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) Highly pilferable items will be inventoried once each month. A copy of the inventory will be kept until the next inventory. c) The facility will be checked at least every 2 hours after normal operating hours by roving guards. 3–10. Subsistence items not at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence activities Risk Level I physical protective measures and the security procedures in paragraph 3–9 will be implemented. 3–11. Repair parts at installation level supply support activities and direct support units with an authorized stockage list (ASL) a. Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 708–1. (2) AR 710–2. (3) AR 735–5. (4) DA Pam 710–2–1. b. Classified repair parts. Secured under AR 380 series requirements and paragraph 3–18 of this regulation. c. Physical protective measures (Risk Level I). 1) Portable repair parts will be secured in the following manner: (a) In a locked, separate building or room, meeting the secure storage structure standards in app B. (b) In a locked, steel cage. (c) In a locked, built–in container (bin, drawer, cabinet) or a free–standing container (desk, wall locker, container express (CONEX)) large and heavy enough to be nonportable with stored parts. (d) To the building in which located or other permanent structure. (2) Nonportable repair parts will be secured in a building with doors and windows locked during those hours the facility is nonoperational. When bulky or heavy items are stored outside, they will be protected by a perimeter barrier. 3) “Off Limits to Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at the storage facility entrance (see AR 420–70). d. Physical protective measures (Risk Level II). (1) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (2) Portable, pilferage–coded items will be separated from other stock and stored in a separate room, building, or container with controlled access. (3) Rooms or buildings will be constructed per secure storage structure standards in appendix B. e. Physical protective measures (Risk Level III). (1) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (2) The storage facility will be lighted during the hours of darkness. (3) IDS will be installed in the storage facility. 4) Landscaping features greater than 1 foot in height and other features which may obstruct views around the facility and provide concealment for aggressors will be eliminated within 20 feet of the facility. f. Security procedural measures (Risk Levels I and II). (1) Access to storage areas and to keys and padlocks and protective seals protecting these items will be controlled. (2) Periodic command–directed inventories will be conducted per AR 710–2. (3) Used parts will be processed as indicated in Department of Defense (DOD) 4160. 21–M to recover parts when prescribed and protect and dispose of nonrecoverable parts, and will be protected and disposed of to preclude recycling. g.

Security procedural measures (Risk Level III). (1) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (2) The facility will be checked at least every 2 hours after normal operating hours by guards. (3) Access for pilferage–coded items will be separately controlled. 3–12. Repair parts not at installation level support activities and direct support units a. Risk Level I physical protective measures and the security procedures in paragraph 3–11 will be implemented. b. Unit and activity repair parts will be stored in a single area, readily accessible to designated maintenance or supply personnel only. 3–13. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) at bulk storage facilities a.

Property management and accountability directives. (1) AR 703–1. AR 190–51 • 30 September 1993 11 (2) AR 710–2. (3) AR 735–5. (4) DA Pam 710–2–1. b. Physical protective measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Construction of storage facilities will be per DOD 4270. 1–M. (b) When not under the surveillance of personnel authorized to dispense the products, POL pumps will be locked and electrical power will be turned off. The electrical power shutoff will be secured. Hoses to pumps will be secured to prevent loss of POL through gravity feed. These measures are not required if pumps are activated by a credit card type device. Use of such devices will be approved by the MACOM concerned. c) Packaged POL will be stored in structures under secure storage structure standards in appendix B. Large POL packages (for example, 55–gallon drums) will be stored to preclude their use as hiding places for pilfered items. (d) Keys to POL storage areas, equipment, and buildings will be controlled per appendix D. (2) Risk Level II. (a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Storage facilities will be bound by a perimeter fence. Gates and openings will be closed and locked. (c) “Off Limits to Unauthorized Personnel” signs will be posted at the perimeter. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) Storage facilities will be lighted during the hours of darkness. c) Seals will be placed on all points of fuel storage that may allow extraction of fuel by any means. A broken seal may indicate tampering. c. Security procedural measures. (1) Risk Level I. (a) Written instructions to POL–dispensing personnel will include procedures for determining if patrons entering the facility are authorized and military vehicles have valid dispatches. (b) When unattended, the facility will be checked at least once every 4 hours. (c) POL credit cards, identification plates, and aviation fuel plates will be centrally controlled by a custodian, preferably at Director of Logistics (DOL) level. Credit cards, identification plates, and aviation fuel plates will be secured in a locked container with controlled access.

They will be controlled through a log book with the signature and rank of the individual to whom issued, credit card and identaplate serial number, aircraft or vehicle number or U. S. Army registration number, and date and time signed out and returned. (d) Privately–owned vehicles will not be permitted in storage facilities. (e) All issues of fuel will be accounted for and supervised by authorized personnel. (f) Hoses or other devices to siphon fuel will be secured. All containers that can be used to carry fuel also will be secured. (g) Containers storing used POL will be marked and stored separately. (h) Keys to POL storage areas, equipment, buildings, and protective seals will be controlled per appendix D. (2) Risk Level II. a) Measures required for Risk Level I will be implemented. (b) Facility attendants will verify all POL quantities issued by personally reading the meter. (c) When unattended, the facility will be checked at least once every 2 hours. (3) Risk Level III. (a) Measures required for Risk Levels I and II will be implemented. (b) The storage facility will be designated a restricted area (see AR 190–13). (c) Continuous surveillance will be made of the facility by guards. (d) Intrusion detection systems may be installed as an alternative to continuous surveillance by guards. (e) Unannounced audits of POL will be conducted at least quarterly. d. Terrorism counteraction measures.

Due to the likely nature of a terrorist attack against this asset, the physical protective measures and security procedural mea

Commanders must ensure that appropriate physical-security measures are taken to minimize the loss of personnel, supplies, equipment, and material through both human and natural threats. Commanders commonly exercise those protective responsibilities through the provost marshal (PM) and/or physical-security officer and the force-protection officer. Papercrete recipe. The force-protection officer must coordinate with several different agencies to complete his mission. For example, the Army's Intelligence and Counterintelligence Program (see Appendix C ) provides information that will be used to complete the unit's crisis-management plan (see Appendix D).

Protective Systems

2-1. The approach to developing protective measures for assets should be based on a systematic process resulting in an integrated protective system. The protective system focuses on protecting specific assets against well-defined threats to acceptable levels of protection. The system is organized in-depth and contains mutually supporting elements coordinated to prevent gaps or overlaps in responsibilities and performance.

2-2. Effective protective systems integrate the following mutually supporting elements:

• Physical protective measures, including barriers, lighting, and electronic security systems (ESSs).
• Procedural security measures, including procedures in place before an incident and those employed in response to an incident. (These include procedures employed by asset owners and those applied by and governing the actions of guards.)
• Terrorism counteraction measures that protect assets against terrorist attacks.

2-3. The following determinations are made when considering system-development procedures:

• The resources available.
• The assets to be protected.
• The threat to those assets.
• The risk levels applicable to those assets.
• The applicable regulatory requirements for protecting the assets.
• The applicable level of protection for those assets against the threat.
• Additional vulnerabilities to the assets (based on the threat).

Systems Development

2-4. AR 190-51, DA Pamphlet (Pam) 190-51, and Technical Manual (TM) 5-853-1 are useful tools for developing protective systems using the systems approach. The key to applying these tools successfully is to use a team approach. A team may include physical-security, intelligence, and operations personnel; the installation engineers; and the user of the assets. It may also include representatives from the multinational, host-nation (HN), and local police as well as the regional security office from the embassy.

Assets

2-5. Protective systems should always be developed for specific assets. The goal of security is to protect facilities and buildings and the assets contained inside. The risk-analysis procedure in DA Pam 190-51 is used to identify assets. This procedure is applied to all mission-essential or vulnerable areas (MEVAs) according to AR 190-13. It represents the majority of assets with which DOD is commonly concerned. These assets include—

• Aircraft and components at aviation facilities.
• Vehicle and carriage-mounted or -towed weapons systems and components at motor pools.
• Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).
• Controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items.
• Communication and electronics equipment; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE); night-vision devices (NVDs); and other high-value precision equipment and tool kits.
• Organizational clothing and individual equipment stored at central-issue facilities.
• Subsistence items at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop-issue facilities.
• Repair parts at installation-level supply activities and direct-support (DS) units with authorized stockage lists.
• Facilities-engineering supplies and construction materials.
• Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices.
• Miscellaneous pilferable assets (not included above) and money.
• Mission-critical or high-risk personnel.
• General military and civilian populations.
• Industrial and utility equipment.
• Controlled cryptographic items.
• Sensitive information (included in TM 5-853-1, but not included in DA Pam 190-51).
• Arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E).
• Installation banks and finance offices.

Risk Levels

2-6. DA Pam 190-51 provides a procedure for determining risk levels—assessing the value of the assets to their users and the likelihood of compromise. These factors are assessed by answering a series of questions leading to value and likelihood ratings.

2-7. Asset value is determined by considering the following three elements:

• The criticality of the asset for its user and the Army as a whole.
• How easily the asset can be replaced.
• Some measure of the asset's relative value.

2-8. The relative value differs for each asset. For some assets, the relative value is measured in terms of monetary cost.

2-9. The likelihood of the threat is assessed for each applicable aggressor category by considering the asset's value to the aggressor, the history of or potential for aggressors attempting to compromise the asset, and the vulnerability of the asset based on existing or planned protective measures.

Regulatory Requirements

2-10. The risk level is the basis for determining the required protective measures for assets covered in AR 190-51. For each asset type, there may be physical protective measures, procedural security measures, and terrorism counteraction measures. These measures are specified by risk level. The measures identified in AR 190-51 are the minimum regulatory measures that must be applied for the identified threat level. The minimum regulatory measures for AA&E are based on the risk category established in AR 190-11.

Antiterrorism/Force-Protection construction standards

2-11. In accordance with DOD Instruction 2000.16, the commanders in chief (CINCs) have developed standards for new construction and existing facilities to counter terrorism threat capabilities within the area of responsibility. These construction standards have specific requirements for such measures as standoff distance, perimeter barriers, building construction, and parking. The DOD construction standard provides for minimum standards that must be incorporated into all inhabited DOD structures regardless of the identified threat. These standards provide a degree of protection that will not preclude the direct effects of blast but will minimize collateral damage for buildings and people and will limit the progressive collapse of structures. These standards add relatively little cost, may facilitate future upgrades, and may deter acts of aggression. (All services have adopted common criteria and minimum standards to counter antiterrorism/force-protection [AT/FP] vulnerabilities and terrorism threats.) Protection to identified threat levels is described in the following paragraphs. Physical-security personnel must be familiar with the CINC and DOD AT/FP construction standards because these standards may affect elements of physical-security plans and how individual facilities are secured.

ThreaT identification

2-12. The threat must be described in specific terms to help determine the assets' vulnerabilities or to establish protective measures. This description should include the tactics that aggressors will use to compromise the asset (weapons, tools, and explosives are likely to be used in an attempt). For example, the threat might be described as a moving vehicle bomb consisting of a 4,000-pound vehicle containing a 500-pound explosive. Another example would be a forced-entry threat using specific hand, power, or thermal tools. These types of threat descriptions (called the design-basis threat) can be used to design detailed protective systems to mitigate the attacks. TM 5-853-1 and DA Pam 190-51 contain procedures for establishing design-basis threat descriptions in the format described above. These procedures can be used together or separately. Threats listed in the TM will be summarized later in this chapter. When using the TM as a lone source or in conjunction with DA Pam 190-51, the following actions occur:

• When the TM process is used alone, the user goes through an identical process to that in DA Pam 190-51 up to the point where the risk level would be determined. In TM 5-853-1, the value and likelihood ratings are used differently than in DA Pam 190-51. The likelihood rating is used to determine the weapons, tools, and explosives that will be used by a particular aggressor in carrying out a specific tactic. In this procedure, higher likelihood ratings result in more severe mixes of weapons, tools, and explosives. The assumption is that the more likely the attack, the more resources the aggressor is likely to use in carrying out the attack.
• When the procedure in TM 5-853-1 is used in conjunction with the results of the DA Pam 190-51 risk analysis, the likelihood rating is taken directly from the risk analysis and applied as described above.

Level of Protection

Usar 190 1

2-13. The level of protection applies to the design of a protective system against a specified threat (for example, a bomb, breaking and entering, pilfering, and so forth). The level of protection is based on the asset's value rating from either DA Pam 190-51 or TM 5-853-1. The level increases as the asset's value rating increases. There are separate levels of protection for each tactic. TM 5-853-1 provides detailed guidance on how to achieve the levels of protection, and Chapter 3 of this manual provides a summary of the levels of protection as they apply to various tactics.

Vulnerabilities

2-14. Vulnerabilities are gaps in the assets' protection. They are identified by considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are associated with those tactics. Some vulnerabilities can be identified by considering the general design strategies for each tactic described in TM 5-853-1 and as summarized in Chapter 3 of this manual. The general design strategies identify the basic approach to protecting assets against specific tactics. For example, the general design strategy for forced entry is to provide a way to detect attempted intrusion and to provide barriers to delay the aggressors until a response force arrives. Vulnerabilities may involve inadequacies in intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) and barriers. Similarly, the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as far from the facility as possible and to harden the facility to resist the explosive at that distance. Vulnerabilities may involve limited standoff distances, inadequate barriers, and building construction that cannot resist explosive effects at the applicable standoff distance.

Protective Measures

2-15. Where vulnerabilities have been identified, protective measures must be identified to mitigate them. AR 190-13, AR 190-51, DA Pam 190-51, and TM 5-853-1 are effective tools for developing protective measures. The key to effective development of protective systems is a partnership between physical-security personnel and the installation engineers. Appendix E of this manual discusses information for office security, which should be listed in the physical-security plan (see Appendix F). Appendix G discusses personal-protection measures.

The Integrated Protective System

2-16. Protective systems integrate physical protective measures and security procedures to protect assets against a design-basis threat. The characteristics of integrated systems include deterrence, detection, defense, and defeat.

Deterrence

2-17. A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be deterred from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with the aggressor's sophistication, the asset's attractiveness, and the aggressor's objective. Although deterrence is not considered a direct design objective, it may be a result of the design.

Detection

2-18. A detection measure senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of the detection, and communicates the appropriate information to a response force. A detection system must provide all three of these capabilities to be effective.

2-19. Detection measures may detect an aggressor's movement via an IDS, or they may detect weapons and tools via X-ray machines or metal and explosive detectors. Detection measures may also include access-control elements that assess the validity of identification (ID) credentials. These control elements may provide a programmed response (admission or denial), or they may relay information to a response force. Guards serve as detection elements, detecting intrusions and controlling access.

2-20. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection systems must be used to measure and validate acts of aggression involving WMD. NBC detection systems should also be used to communicate a warning.

Defense

2-21. Defensive measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or preventing an aggressor's movement toward the asset or by shielding the asset from weapons and explosives. Defensive measures—

• Delay aggressors from gaining access by using tools in a forced entry. These measures include barriers along with a response force.
• Prevent an aggressor's movement toward an asset. These measures provide barriers to movement and obscure lines of sight (LOSs) to assets.
• Protect the asset from the effects of tools, weapons, and explosives.

2-22. Defensive measures may be active or passive. Active defensive measures are manually or automatically activated in response to acts of aggression. Passive defensive measures do not depend on detection or a response. They include such measures as blast-resistant building components and fences. Guards may also be considered as a defensive measure.

Defeat

2-23. Most protective systems depend on response personnel to defeat an aggressor. Although defeat is not a design objective, defensive and detection systems must be designed to accommodate (or at least not interfere with) response-force activities.

Security Threats

2-24. Security threats are acts or conditions that may result in the compromise of sensitive information; loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction of property; or disruption of mission. Physical-security personnel and design teams must understand the threat to the assets they are to protect in order to develop effective security programs or design security systems. Historical patterns and trends in aggressor activity indicate general categories of aggressors and the common tactics they use against military assets. Aggressor tactics and their associated tools, weapons, and explosives are the basis for the threat to assets.

Threat Sources

2-25. There are many potential sources of threat information. Threat assessment is normally a military-intelligence (MI) responsibility. MI personnel commonly focus on such security threats as terrorists and military forces. Within the US and its territories, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has primary responsibility for both foreign and domestic terrorists. The FBI, the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC [CID]), and local law-enforcement agencies are good sources for physical-security personnel to obtain criminal threat information. Coordinating with these elements on a regular basis is essential to maintaining an effective security program.

Threat Categories

2-26. Security threats are classified as either human or natural. Human threats are carried out by a wide range of aggressors who may have one or more objectives toward assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations. Aggressors can be categorized and their objectives can be generalized as described below. (See DA Pam 190-51 and TM 5-853-1 for more information.)

Aggressor Objectives

2-27. Four major objectives describe an aggressor's behavior. Any one of the first three objectives can be used to realize the fourth. These objectives include—

• Inflicting injury or death on people.
• Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
• Stealing equipment, materiel, or information.
• Creating adverse publicity.

Aggressor Categories

2-28. Aggressors are grouped into five broad categories—criminals, vandals and activists, extremists, protest groups, and terrorists. Hostile acts performed by these aggressors range from crimes (such as burglary) to low-intensity conflict threats (such as unconventional warfare). Each of these categories describes predictable aggressors who pose threats to military assets and who share common objectives and tactics.

• Criminals can be characterized based on their degree of sophistication. They are classified as unsophisticated criminals, sophisticated criminals, and organized criminal groups. Their common objective is the theft of assets; however, the assets they target, the quantities they seek, their relative efficiency, and the sophistication of their actions vary significantly. Vandals and activists may also be included under this category.
• Vandals and activists are groups of protesters who are politically or issue oriented. They act out of frustration, discontent, or anger against the actions of other social or political groups. Their primary objectives commonly include destruction and publicity. Their selection of targets will vary based on the risk associated with attacking them. The degree of damage they seek to cause will vary with their sophistication.
• Extremists are radical in their political beliefs and may take extreme, violent actions to gain support for their beliefs or cause.
• Protesters are considered a threat only if they are violent. Lawful protesters have to be considered, but significant protective measures and procedures are not normally needed to control their actions. The presence of extremists or vandals/activists at a peaceful protest increases the chance of the protest becoming violent.
• Terrorists are ideologically, politically, or issue oriented. They commonly work in small, well-organized groups or cells. They are sophisticated, are skilled with tools and weapons, and possess an efficient planning capability. There are three types of terrorists—CONUS, OCONUS, and paramilitary OCONUS.
• CONUS terrorists are typically right- or left-wing extremists operating in distinct areas of the US.
• OCONUS terrorists generally are more organized than CONUS terrorists. They usually include ethnically or religiously oriented groups.
• Paramilitary OCONUS terrorist groups show some military capability with a broad range of military and improvised weapons. Attacks by OCONUS terrorists are typically more severe.

2-29. Natural threats are usually the consequence of natural phenomena. They are not preventable by physical-security measures, but they are likely to have significant effects on security systems and operations. They may require an increase in protective measures either to address new situations or to compensate for the loss of existing security measures. They may reduce the effectiveness of existing security measures by such occurrences as collapsed perimeter fences and barriers, inoperable protective lighting, damaged patrol vehicles, and poor visibility. Natural threats and their effects relative to security include the following:

• Floods may result in property damage, destruction of perimeter fences, and damage to IDSs. Heavy rains or snowfalls may have similar effects even if they do not result in flooding.
• Storms, tornadoes, high winds, or rain may cause nuisance alarms to activate and cause damage to IDSs. They may limit the visibility of security personnel and may affect closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems. Winds may also disrupt power or communication lines and cause safety hazards from flying debris.
• Earthquakes may cause nuisance alarms to activate or may disrupt IDSs. They may also cause broken water or gas mains, fallen electrical or communication lines, and weakened or collapsed buildings.
• Snow and ice can make travel on patrol roads difficult, may delay responses to alarms, may impede the performance of IDSs, and may freeze locks and alarm mechanisms. Heavy ice may also damage power and communication lines.
• Fires may damage or destroy perimeter barriers and buildings, possibly leaving assets susceptible to damage or theft.
• Fog can reduce the visibility of security forces, thereby requiring additional security personnel. It may also increase the response time to alarms and reduce the effectiveness of security equipment such as CCTV systems.

Aggressor Tactics

2-30. Aggressors have historically used a wide range of offensive strategies reflecting their capabilities and objectives. These offensive strategies are categorized into 15 tactics that are specific methods of achieving aggressor goals (see TM 5-853-1). Separating these tactics into categories allows facility planners and physical-security personnel to define threats in standardized terms usable as a basis for facility and security-system design. Common aggressor tactics include—

• Moving vehicle bomb. An aggressor drives an explosive-laden car or truck into a facility and detonates the explosives. His goal is to damage or destroy the facility or to kill people. This is a suicide attack.
• Stationary vehicle bomb. An aggressor covertly parks an explosive-laden car or truck near a facility. He then detonates the explosives either by time delay or remote control. His goal in this tactic is the same as for the moving vehicle bomb with the additional goal of destroying assets within the blast area. This is commonly not a suicide attack. It is the most frequent application of vehicle bombings.
• Exterior attack. An aggressor attacks a facility's exterior or an exposed asset at close range. He uses weapons such as rocks, clubs, improvised incendiary or explosive devices, and hand grenades. Weapons (such as small arms) are not included in this tactic, but are considered in subsequent tactics. His goal is to damage the facility, to injure or kill its occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
• Standoff weapons. An aggressor fires military weapons or improvised versions of military weapons at a facility from a significant distance. These weapons include direct (such as antitank [AT] weapons) and indirect LOS weapons (such as mortars). His goal is to damage the facility, to injure or kill its occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
• Ballistics. The aggressor fires various small arms (such as pistols, submachine guns, shotguns, and rifles) from a distance. His goal is to injure or kill facility occupants or to damage or destroy assets.
• Forced entry. The aggressor forcibly enters a facility using forced-entry tools (such as hand, power, and thermal tools) and explosives. He uses the tools to create a man-passable opening or to operate a device in the facility's walls, doors, roof, windows, or utility openings. He may also use small arms to overpower guards. His goal is to steal or destroy assets, compromise information, injure or kill facility occupants, or disrupt operations.
• Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter a facility or a portion of a facility by using false credentials or stealth. He may try to carry weapons or explosives into the facility. His goals include those listed for forced entry.
• Insider compromise. A person authorized access to a facility (an insider) attempts to compromise assets by taking advantage of that accessibility. The aggressor may also try to carry weapons or explosives into the facility in this tactic. His goals are the same as those listed for forced entry.
• Visual surveillance. The aggressor uses ocular and photographic devices (such as binoculars and cameras with telephoto lenses) to monitor facility or installation operations or to see assets. His goal is to compromise information. As a precursor, he uses this tactic to determine information about the asset of interest.
• Acoustic eavesdropping. The aggressor uses listening devices to monitor voice communications or other audibly transmitted information. His goal is to compromise information.
• Electronic-emanations eavesdropping. The aggressor uses electronic-emanation surveillance equipment from outside a facility or its restricted area to monitor electronic emanations from computers, communications, and related equipment. His goal is to compromise information.
• Mail-bomb delivery. The aggressor delivers bombs or incendiary devices to the target in letters or packages. The bomb sizes involved are relatively small. His goal is to kill or injure people.
• Supplies-bomb delivery. The aggressor conceals bombs in various containers and delivers them to supply- and material-handling points such as loading docks. The bomb sizes in this tactic can be significantly larger that those in mail bombs. His goal is to damage the facility, kill or injure its occupants, or damage or destroy assets. Appendix H addresses the actions to take when a bomb is suspected.
• Airborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility's air supply by introducing chemical or biological agents into it. His goal is to kill or injure people.
• Waterborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility's water supply by introducing chemical, biological, or radiological agents into it. These agents can be introduced into the system at any location with varying effects, depending on the quantity of water and the contaminant involved. His goal is to kill or injure people.

2-31. The aforementioned tactics are typical threats to fixed facilities for which designers and physical-security personnel can provide protective measures. However, some common terrorist acts are beyond the protection that facility designers can provide. They cannot control kidnappings, hijackings, and assassinations that take place away from facilities or during travel between facilities. Protection against these threats is provided through operational security and personal measures (see Appendix G and Appendix I), which are covered in doctrine relative to those activities and are under the general responsibility of the CID.

Tactical Environment Considerations

2-32. When determining the assets and threats, the same considerations should be given to the systems approach in the tactical environment as when in the cantonment area. The same process of determining the assets, their risk level, and any regulatory guidance apply. Identifying potential threats and the level of protection required for the assets are necessary. Commanders and leaders must also identify additional vulnerabilities and other required protective measures. Commanders are not expected to have the same physical protective measures due to the impact of resources, budget, location, and situations.

2-33. Commanders must consider the various tactics used by aggressors and use their soldiers' abilities to counteract these tactics. Considerations for specific assets (such as military-working-dog [MWD] and explosive-ordnance-disposal [EOD] teams and their abilities to detect and disassemble a bomb) must be identified. Units must have the ability to improvise in a tactical environment. Their training and resourcefulness will compensate for shortcomings in the field.

2-34. The systems approach to security provides focus and integration of resources. Protective systems are mutually supporting and systematically developed to negate the threat. Commanders conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and vulnerability assessments (VAs) to determine risks. Security resources and measures are applied to mitigate risks and to deter, detect, defend, and defeat the threat.

Usarc Pam 190 1 Physical Security Program 190 13 1

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Usarak Reg 190 1